Detailed Results – Public Opinion Research Study on Electoral Matters - Wave 4

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Main sources of news

Around three in 10 electors in March 2024 turned to television (29%) and to online news websites or apps (28%) as their main source of news. Posts by news organizations and journalists on social media were the third most popular medium (15%). Less than one in 10 electors preferred posts by friends or family on social media (9%), radio (7%), other online news content (4%) and print newspapers or magazines (3%).

Notable subgroup differences regarding March 2024 respondents' main source of news include the following:

• Men were more likely to turn to online news (33% versus 22% among women), while women were more likely to turn to social media posts by friends or family (11% versus 6% among men).
• Electors aged 18 to 34 were more likely to favour social media posts by friends or family (18% versus 2% among those over 55 years old) as well as social media posts by news organizations and journalists (29% versus 7% among 55 years or older). Young electors (18 to 34 years old) were also more likely to not follow the news (8% versus 2% among those over 55 years old). On the other hand, those aged 35 to 54 more often preferred online news websites or apps (32% versus 24% among 18- to 34-year-olds), while respondents aged 55 and older were more likely to turn to television (47% versus 9% among 18- to 34-year-olds and 24% among 35- to 54-year-olds).
• Respondents from Quebec were more likely to turn to television (36%) or radio (11%), while respondents from Ontario were more likely to turn to online news websites or apps (30%) compared with those from other parts of Canada.
• Electors with some amount of university education were more likely to prefer online news websites or apps (33%), while those with some college or trade school (24%) and those with a high school education or less (19%) were less likely. On the other hand, those with some college or trade school (33%) and those with a high school education or less (34%) were more likely to prefer television as their main source of news compared to those with some amount of university education (25%).
• Non-Indigenous electors were more likely to state that television was their main source of news (30%).
• Respondents who were interested in politics were more likely to turn to online news websites or apps (31% versus 20% for those who were not) and television (32% versus 24% for those who were not). On the other hand, respondents who were not interested in politics were more likely to consult posts made by friends or family (15% versus 6% for those who were) or simply not follow the news (12% versus 1% for those who were).
• Habitual voters were more likely to turn to television (33% versus 19% among infrequent voters) and online news websites or apps (30% versus 22%), while infrequent voters were more likely to prefer social media posts by friends and family (16% versus 6% among habitual voters), by news organizations (20% versus 13%), or state that they do not follow the news (10% versus 3%).¹
• Respondents who held no conspiracy beliefs were more likely to turn to online news websites and apps (34%), while those who held strong or mixed conspiracy beliefs were more likely to turn to posts by friends and family on social media (12% and 10%, respectively) as their main source of news.
• Respondents who often saw news about Canadian politics were more likely to state that television (33%) and online news websites or apps (30%) were their main sources of news, while those who rarely saw news about politics from any origin were more likely to turn to social media posts by friends and family (25%) as their main sources of news. Those who often see news about US/world politics but rarely see news about Canadian politics were more likely to indicate social media posts by friends and family (19%) as well as posts by news organizations or journalists (27%) as their main source of news.

News origin

When thinking about their main source of news, 80% of respondents said they often see stories covering Canadian politics, including 43% who said very often. 73% said they often see stories covering US politics (35% very often), and 68% said they often see stories covering world politics (25% very often).

Among the 18% of respondents who rarely see news about Canadian politics, respondents were further grouped based on whether they often see news about politics of any origin, as follows:

• 5% said they often see news about US/world politics but rarely see news about Canadian politics
• 13% said they rarely see news about politics from any origin

The likelihood of seeing stories covering Canadian politics varied across the following demographic groups:

• Men (84%) were more likely than women (76%).
• Respondents over 55 years old (91%) were more likely, while those aged 18 to 34 (66%) and 35 to 54 (78%) were less likely.
• Residents of Manitoba/Saskatchewan (71%) were less likely than those in other parts of Canada.
• Respondents living in urban or suburban areas (82%) were more likely than those who live in rural or small-town areas (76%).
• Respondents with a university degree (84%) were more likely than those with a high school or lower education level (73%).
• Respondents without a disability (81%) were more likely than those with a disability (74%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (92%) were more likely than those who are not (54%).
• Habitual voters (86%) were more likely than infrequent voters (64%).
• Respondents who know provincial and federal areas of jurisdiction (85%) were more likely than those who do not (62%).
• Respondents who do not hold any conspiracy beliefs (87%) were more likely, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (76%) were less likely.
• Respondents who are generally trustful of people (86%) were more likely than those who tend to be distrustful (78%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat polarized (85%) or strongly polarized (87%) in how they relate to other Canadians politically were more likely, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (74%).

Interest in politics

Most electors were interested in politics (68%), including one in four (25%) who were very interested and over four in 10 (43%) who were somewhat interested. On the other hand, around three in 10 (32%) were not interested in politics, including one in five (21%) who were not very interested, and around one in 10 (11%) who were not at all interested.

Interest in politics varied across the following groups:

• Men (78%) were more likely to be interested in politics than women (58%).
• Electors 55 and older (77%) were more likely to be interested in politics, while electors aged 35 to 54 (64%) and 18 to 34 (58%) were less likely.
• Respondents with at least some university education (76%) were more likely to be interested in politics, whereas those with a high school or less education (54%) and those with a college degree (62%) were less likely.
• Respondents living in British Columbia (73%) were more likely to be interested.
• Respondents living in urban or suburban areas (71%) were more likely to be interested in politics than those who lived in rural areas or small towns (61%).
• Habitual voters (74%) were more likely to be interested than infrequent voters (50%).
• Those who voted in the 2021 federal general election (74%) were more likely to be interested in politics than those who were eligible but did not vote (59%).²
• Respondents who had knowledge of federal and provincial powers (73%) were more likely to be interested than those who did not (50%).
• Electors with no conspiracy beliefs (76%) were more likely to be interested in politics, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (61%) were less likely.
• Respondents who generally trust people (76%) were more likely to be interested in politics than those who do not (64%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to be interested in politics (78%), while those who often see news about US/world politics but rarely about Canadian politics (58%) and those who rarely see news about politics from any origin (14%) were less likely.
• Respondents who feel somewhat (76%) or strongly (82%) polarized in how they relate to other Canadians politically were more likely to be interested in politics, while those who do not feel polarized (57%) were less likely.

Knowledge of provincial powers

A vast majority of electors knew in March 2024 that the provincial level of government is primarily responsible for education (81%), while one in 10 attributed the responsibility to the federal government (10%). In lesser proportions, some respondents thought it was the municipal government's responsibility (3%), and some others (5%) did not know the answer. These results remain stable since March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to attribute the responsibility for education to the provincial government:

• Men (84%) were more likely than women (79%).
• Electors 55 years old and over (89%) were more likely, while those aged 35 to 54 years old (78%) and 18 to 34 years old (73%) were less likely.
• Respondents from Quebec (88%) were more likely.
• Respondents with some university-level education (87%) were more likely, whereas those with a high school or lower-level education were less likely (68%).
• Non-Indigenous respondents (82%) were more likely than Indigenous respondents (69%).
• Respondents without a disability (83%) were more likely than those with one (73%).
• Respondents interested in politics (87%) were more likely than those who are not interested (70%).
• Habitual voters (87%) were more likely than infrequent voters (63%).
• 2021 voters (87%) were more likely than their non-voter counterparts (68%).
• Respondents with no conspiracy beliefs (91%) were more likely compared to those who have mixed (79%) or strong conspiracy beliefs (68%).
• Respondents who generally trust people (86%) were more likely than those who do not (80%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics (85%) were more likely, while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (64%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat polarized politically (84%) were more likely than those who do not (79%).

Knowledge of federal powers

In March 2024, a vast majority of electors had knowledge of federal powers: nine in 10 knew the federal government is primarily responsible for defence (88%). Small proportions thought it was the provincial government (5%), the municipal government (1%), or did not know the answer (6%). These results are stable since March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to attribute the responsibility for defence to the federal government:

• Men (90%) were more likely than women (86%).
• Electors 55 years old and over (96%) were more likely, while those aged 18 to 34 (78%) were less likely to do so.
• Respondents living in urban or suburban areas (90%) were more likely to do so than those who lived in rural areas or small towns (85%).
• Non-Indigenous respondents (89%) were less likely compared to Indigenous respondents (80%).
• Respondents with at least some university level education (93%) were more likely, while those with a high school or lower-level education were less likely (76%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (93%) were more likely than those who are not interested (79%).
• Habitual voters (94%) were more likely than infrequent voters (72%).
• 2021 voters (94%) were more likely than 2021 non-voters (72%).
• Respondents with no conspiracy beliefs (95%) were more likely, while those who have mixed (85%) or strong conspiracy beliefs (84%) were less likely.
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics (93%) were more likely, while those who only often see news about US/world politics (78%) and those who rarely see news about politics from any origin (70%) were less likely.
• Respondents who feel somewhat polarized politically (90%) were more likely than those who do not feel polarized politically (87%).

Confidence in institutions in Canada

Respondents were asked to rate their confidence in seven institutions in Canada, presented at random. The largest proportion (70%) of respondents said they have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the police, followed closely by confidence in Elections Canada (69%). Around half expressed confidence in the provincial government (50%) as well as the mainstream media (49%). Under half expressed confidence in the federal government (45%), a significant drop from 2023 (53%). Around a third (34%) had confidence in big businesses and corporations, and only just over one in five (21%) had confidence in social media platforms.

In the detailed results, Elections Canada had the highest proportion (25%) of electors who stated that they have a great deal of confidence in them, compared to the police (18%), the federal and provincial governments (8% and 7%, respectively) and the mainstream media (7%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in EC³

• Men (74%) were more likely than women (65%).
• Electors 55 and older (78%) were more likely to have confidence in EC, whereas electors aged 35 to 54 (65%) and 18 to 34 (61%) were less likely.
• Electors in British Columbia (74%) and in Quebec (74%) were more likely to have confidence in EC.
• Respondents from urban or suburban areas (72%) were more likely to have confidence in EC than those who live in rural or small-town areas (64%).
• Respondents with at least some university education (79%) were more likely to have confidence in EC, while those with college (64%) or high school or less education were less likely (54%).
• Immigrant respondents (77%) were more likely than Canadian-born respondents (69%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (77%) were more likely to have confidence in EC than those who are not interested (53%).
• Habitual voters (77%) were more likely to have confidence in EC than infrequent voters (49%).
• 2021 voters (76%) were more likely to have confidence in EC than non-voters (56%).
• Respondents who have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (75%) were more likely to have confidence in EC than those who do not (49%).
• Electors who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (89%) were more likely to have confidence in EC, whereas those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (62%) or strong conspiracy beliefs (49%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to trust people (83%) were more likely to have confidence in EC than those who do not (62%).
• People who often see news about Canadian politics (75%) were more likely to have confidence in EC, while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (42%).
• Those who feel somewhat (75%) or strongly (79%) polarized were more likely to have confidence in EC, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (62%).

Opinion on the fairness of federal elections

Overall, a majority (79%) of electors in March 2024 thought that Elections Canada runs federal elections fairly, with almost half of these (38%) thinking EC runs elections very fairly and another half (41%) saying somewhat fairly. On the other hand, 12% believed Elections Canada runs elections unfairly (9% somewhat unfairly, 3% very unfairly).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that Elections Canada runs federal elections fairly in general:

• Men (84%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than women (75%).
• Electors 55 and older (88%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly, whereas electors aged 35 to 54 (74%) and 18 to 34 (73%) were less likely.
• Electors from British Columbia (84%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly.
• Respondents living in urban or suburban areas (82%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than those living in rural or small-town areas (73%).
• Respondents with at least some university education (85%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly, while those with some college or trade education (76%) or a high school or less education (70%) were less likely.
• Non-Indigenous respondents were more likely (80%) than Indigenous respondents (70%).
• Immigrant respondents (86%) were more likely, while Canadian-born respondents were less likely (79%).
• Respondents without a disability (80%) were more likely than respondents with one (74%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (86%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than those who are not interested (66%).
• Habitual voters (85%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than infrequent voters (62%).
• 2021 voters (85%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than non-voters (69%).
• Respondents who know federal and provincial powers (85%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than those who do not (62%).
• Electors who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (93%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (74%) and those with strong conspiracy beliefs (67%) were less likely.
• Those who are generally trustful of people (92%) were more likely to say that EC runs elections fairly than those who are not (74%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics (84%) were more likely to think EC runs elections fairly, while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (54%).
• Respondents who feel strongly polarized (84%) and somewhat polarized (84%) politically were more likely to think EC runs elections fairly, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (74%).

Reasons for thinking Elections Canada runs elections unfairly

Among the 12% of respondents in March 2024 who thought that Elections Canada runs elections unfairly, around a third (35%) provided a reason for this opinion. The other two thirds (65%) did not have any particular reason (38%), did not know (10%) or preferred not to answer (16%).

The most common specific reasons for thinking Elections Canada runs elections unfairly were concerns about the regional distribution of seats being unfair or allows elections to be decided by Ontario and Quebec (6%), electoral integrity and security or thinking elections are "rigged" (6%), the electoral system (5%), that ballots are inaccurately tallied/votes are incorrectly tabulated (3%), and a general mistrust of government and politicians (3%). Other reasons were mentioned to a lesser extent.

The following reasons for thinking Elections Canada runs elections unfairly were mentioned by a significantly lower proportion of respondents in March 2024 compared to March 2023:

• Concerns about electoral integrity and security: how the rules are applied, including broad statements about ?rigging? (6% in March 2024 versus 18% in March 2023)
• Concerns about foreign/Chinese influence or interference (2% in March 2024 versus 7% in March 2023)

The following reasons for thinking Elections Canada runs elections unfairly were mentioned by a significantly higher proportion of respondents in March 2024 compared to March 2023:

• Ballots are inaccurately tallied / Votes are incorrectly tabulated (3% in March 2024 versus 0% in March 2023)
• The electoral system (5% versus 0%)
• No particular reason (38% versus 30%)

Notable subgroup differences regarding respondents' main reasons to think that Elections Canada runs elections unfairly include the following:

• Women (5%) were more likely to express mistrust of government, politics or politicians.
• Respondents aged 18 to 34 (47%) and those with a high school or less education level (49%) were more likely to mention no particular reason.
• Respondents with at least some university education (10%) were more likely to mention the electoral system. Non-Indigenous respondents were significantly more likely to mention the electoral system (6%), concerns about fairness of the system and the electoral rules themselves being unfair (3%), concerns about foreign or Chinese influence or interference (3%) and being displeased with the election outcome (2%).
• Canadian-born respondents were significantly more likely to mention regional distribution of seats being unfair, the election being decided by Ontario/Quebec (7%), concerns about electoral integrity and security on how the rules are applied, including broad statements about rigging (6%), the electoral system (6%), concerns about foreign/Chinese influence/interference (3%), too much potential for voter fraud (2%) and being displeased with election outcome (2%), while immigrant voters were more likely to report they do not know (35%).
• Respondents who do not have a disability were more likely to mention the electoral system (6%).
• Respondents who reported being interested in politics were more likely to mention concerns about electoral integrity and security on how the rules are applied, including broad statements about rigging (9%) and regional distribution of seats being unfair, election being decided by Ontario/Quebec (9%).
• Habitual voters were more likely to mention the regional distribution of seats being unfair, election being decided by Ontario/Quebec (8%), concerns about electoral integrity and security on how the rules are applied, including broad statements about rigging (8%), the electoral system (7%), and ballots being inaccurately tallied / votes being incorrectly tabulated (4%).
• Respondents who know provincial and federal powers were more likely to mention concerns about electoral integrity and security on how the rules are applied, including broad statements about rigging (8%), regional distribution of seats being unfair, election being decided by Ontario/Quebec (8%), concerns about foreign/Chinese influence/interference (4%), ballots being inaccurately tallied / votes being incorrectly tabulated (4%), and too much potential for voter fraud (3%).
• Respondents who are distrustful of people were more likely to mention being displeased with the election outcome (3%).

Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to mention concerns about electoral integrity and security on how the rules are applied, including broad statements about rigging (8%) and concerns about foreign/Chinese influence or interference (3%).

Trust in election changes

A split sample experiment was conducted to explore whether electors have general trust in the government to propose changes to how federal elections are run, and if they specifically trust Elections Canada to propose changes.

In one half of the split sample, nearly two thirds (64%) of respondents agreed that if the government proposes changes to how federal elections are run, they are probably trying to make voting easier or fairer for all Canadians: 18% strongly agreed, and 47% somewhat agreed. Conversely, one fifth (22%) of respondents disagreed: 14% somewhat disagreed and 8% strongly disagreed; 14% said they did not know. Overall, results for both versions of the statement remain stable since March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to agree that the government proposes changes to how federal elections are run in order to make voting easier or fairer for all Canadians:

• Electors from Quebec (71%) were more likely to agree, while those from Alberta (52%) were less likely to agree compared to those from all other parts of Canada.
• Respondents with at least some university education (68%) were more likely to agree, while those with some college or trade education (60%) were less likely.
• Respondents who do not have a disability were more likely to agree than those who do (66% versus 57%).
• Respondents interested in politics (68%) were more likely to agree than those who are not interested (57%).
• Habitual voters were more likely to agree (67%) than infrequent voters (56%).
• Respondents who know of provincial and federal powers were more likely to agree (66%) than those who do not (59%).
• Respondents who hold no conspiracy beliefs (74%) were more likely to agree, whereas those who hold mixed conspiracy beliefs (59%) were less likely.
• Respondents who are generally trustful of people (72%) were more likely to agree than those who are not (62%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to agree (67%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (54%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat polarized in how they relate to other Canadians politically were more likely to agree (72%), while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (56%).

In the other half of the split sample, a higher proportion (74%) of respondents agreed that if Elections Canada proposes changes to how federal elections are run, they are probably trying to make voting easier or fairer for all Canadians: 28% strongly agreed, and 46% somewhat agreed. Conversely, 9% somewhat disagreed and 4% strongly disagreed, while 13% said they did not know, down significantly from 16% in March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to agree that Elections Canada proposes changes to how federal elections are run in order to make voting easier or fairer for all Canadians:

• Men (79%) were more likely to agree than women (69%).
• Electors from Quebec were more likely to agree (80%), while those from Manitoba/Saskatchewan were less likely (63%).
• Respondents with a university degree or higher were more likely to agree (79%), while those with some high school or less education (65%) were less likely.
• Respondents who do not have a disability were more likely to agree than those who do (75% versus 65%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (79%) were more likely to agree than those who are not (64%).
• Habitual voters were more likely to agree (77%) than infrequent voters (64%).
• Respondents who know provincial and federal powers were more likely to agree (76%) than those who did not (65%).
• Respondents who hold no conspiracy beliefs (89%) were more likely to agree, whereas those who hold mixed conspiracy beliefs (68%) or strong conspiracy beliefs (61%) were less likely.
• Respondents who are generally trustful of people (85%) were more likely to agree than those who are not (69%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to agree (77%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (57%).
• Respondents who feel strongly (80%) or somewhat (77%) polarized politically were more likely to agree, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (69%).

Electoral interference

Respondents were asked if they thought different types of electoral interference could have any impact on the outcome of the next federal election in Canada.

The largest proportion (80%) of electors in March 2024 thought that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or more impact on the outcome of the next federal elections (45% a major impact). The second-largest proportion (69%) thought foreign countries or groups using social media and other means to influence the political opinions of Canadians could have an impact (30% a major impact), closely followed by those (68%) who thought that foreign money being used to influence Canadian politics could have an impact (30% a major impact). Finally, six in 10 (64%) electors thought hacking by foreign countries or groups into the computer systems that support the election could have an impact on the election (33% a major impact).

A significantly higher proportion of respondents thought that there could be a major impact from foreign countries or groups using social media and other means to influence the political opinions of Canadians (net impact: 69% vs 65% in March 2023) and from the spread of false information online (net impact: 80% versus 76%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "the spread of false information online" could have a moderate or major impact on the outcome of the next federal election:

• Electors 55 and older (82%) were more likely to think that "the spread of false information online" could have a moderate or major impact on the outcome of the next federal election compared to others.
• Electors from Quebec were more likely (83%), while those from the Atlantic provinces were less likely (72%).
• Respondents who live in urban or suburban areas (81%) were more likely to think so than those who live in rural or small-town areas (76%).
• Electors with a university degree or higher (83%) were more likely, while those with a high school degree or less were less likely (73%).
• Immigrant respondents (86%) were more likely, while Canadian-born respondents were less likely (79%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (83%) were more likely than those who are not interested in politics (72%).
• Habitual voters (82%) were more likely than infrequent voters (71%).
• 2021 voters (82%) were more likely than non-voters (74%).
• Electors who know federal and provincial powers (82%) were more likely than those who do not (70%).
• Electors with no conspiracy beliefs (83%) were more likely, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (77%) were less likely.
• People who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely (82%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (68%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat (84%) or strongly (89%) polarized politically were more likely, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (73%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "foreign countries or groups using social media and other means to influence the political opinions of Canadians" could have a moderate or major impact on the outcome of the next federal election:

• Men were more likely (71%), while women were less likely (66%).
• Electors over 55 years old (74%) were more likely to think that foreign countries or groups using social media and other means to influence Canadians' political opinions could have an impact, whereas electors aged 18 to 34 (62%) were less likely to think so.
• Electors from Ontario were more likely (72%), while those from Manitoba/Saskatchewan were less likely (60%).
• Electors with a university degree or higher (73%) were more likely, while those with a high school degree or less were less likely (61%).
• Immigrants were more likely (75%), while Canadian-born respondents were less likely (68%).
• Respondents interested in politics (75%) were more likely to think that foreign influence efforts on social media and other means could have an impact than those who are not interested (56%).
• Habitual voters (71%) were more likely to think that foreign influence efforts on social media and other means could have an impact than infrequent voters (62%).
• 2021 voters (71%) were more likely than non-voters (67%).
• Respondents who have knowledge of provincial and federal powers (72%) were more likely to think that foreign influence efforts could have an impact than those who do not (59%).
• Electors with strong conspiracy beliefs (80%) were more likely to think that foreign influence efforts could have an impact whereas those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (66%) were less likely to think so.
• People who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to think that foreign influence efforts could have an impact (73%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely to think so (49%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat (75%) or strongly (79%) polarized politically were more likely to think foreign influence efforts could have an impact, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (61%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "foreign money being used to influence politics in Canada" could have a moderate or major impact on the outcome of the next federal election:

• Electors over 55 years old (74%) were more likely to think that foreign money could have an impact, whereas electors aged 18 to 34 (60%) were less likely to think so.
• Respondents who live in urban or suburban areas (70%) were more likely to think so than those who live in rural or small-town areas (66%).
• Electors with a university degree or higher (71%) were more likely, while those with a high school degree or less were less likely (59%).
• Immigrants were more likely (75%), while Canadian-born respondents were less likely (67%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (75%) were more likely to think that foreign money could have an impact, while those who are not interested were less likely (55%).
• Habitual voters (72%) were more likely to think that foreign money could have an impact than infrequent voters (59%).
• 2021 voters (72%) were more likely, while non-voters were less likely (62%).
• Respondents who know provincial and federal powers (71%) were more likely to think that foreign money could have an impact than those who do not (59%).
• Respondents who hold strong conspiracy beliefs (83%) were more likely to think that foreign money could have an impact, whereas those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (66%) or no conspiracy beliefs (66%) were less likely to think so.
• People who often see news about Canadian politics (73%) were more likely to think that foreign money could have an impact, while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin (48%) were less likely.
• Respondents who feel strongly (76%) or somewhat (75%) polarized politically were more likely, while those who do not feel polarized (61%) were less likely.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "hacking by foreign countries or groups into the computer systems that support the election" could have a moderate or major impact on the outcome of the next federal election:

• Electors over 55 years old (70%) were more likely to think that hacking into election systems could have an impact on the outcome of the next election, while those who are 18 to 34 (57%) were less likely to think so.
• Quebec electors (72%) were more likely than those in other regions to believe that hacking could have an impact, while electors from Alberta (58%) and British Columbia (59%) were less likely to think so.
• Those with a college degree (67%) were more likely to think so.
• Immigrant respondents were more likely to think so (70%), while Canadian-born respondents were less likely (63%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (68%) were more likely to think that hacking could have an impact than those who are not (55%).
• Habitual voters (66%) were more likely to believe that hacking could have an impact than infrequent voters (59%).
• Respondents who have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (65%) were more likely to consider that hacking could have an impact than those who do not (60%).
• Electors with strong conspiracy beliefs (77%) were more likely to think that hacking could have an impact, while those who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (58%) were less likely to think so.
• Respondents who are generally distrustful of people (67%) were more likely to agree than those who are (63%).
• People who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to think that hacking could have an impact (67%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely to think so (49%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat (68%) or strongly (71%) polarized politically were more likely to think hacking could have an impact, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (58%).

Opinions on the integrity of the voting system in Canada

In March 2024, around six out of 10 respondents (63%) from a split sample of electors thought that the voting system in Canada is safe and reliable, a little under one in four thought it is prone to fraud (24%), and one in 10 did not know (13%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to believe that the voting system in Canada is safe and reliable:

• Men (67%) were more likely to think that the voting system is safe and reliable than women (59%) were.
• Electors over 55 years old (69%) were more likely to think that the voting system is safe and reliable, while those who are 35 to 54 (58%) were less likely to think so.
• Electors from the Atlantic provinces were more likely to agree with voting being safe and reliable (73%).
• Respondents who live in an urban or suburban area (65%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable, while those who live in rural or small-town areas were less likely (58%).
• Respondents with at least some university education (72%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable, while respondents with a college degree (56%) and high school or less education (50%) were less likely.
• Respondents who are interested in politics (68%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable than those who are not interested (51%).
• Habitual voters (68%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable than infrequent voters (47%).
• Those who voted in the 2021 election (69%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable than those who did not vote in 2021 (48%).
• Respondents who have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (69%) were more likely than those who do not (45%).
• Electors who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (85%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (55%) and those with strong conspiracy beliefs (39%) were less likely.
• Electors who tend to be trustful toward people (75%) were more likely to think the voting system is safe and reliable, while those who are distrustful were less likely (55%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to think voting is safe and reliable (67%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (42%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat (68%) polarized politically were more likely to think voting is safe and reliable, while those who do not feel polarized were less likely (57%).

Opinions on the integrity of voting by mail in Canada

In March 2024, just under four in 10 (35%) from a split sample of respondents thought voting by mail is safe and reliable, and just over four out of 10 thought it is prone to fraud (44%). One in five (21%) did not know.

A significantly lower proportion of respondents agreed with the statement "Voting by mail is safe and reliable" in March 2024 (35%) compared to March 2023 (42%), continuing the trend observed since April 2021.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to believe that voting by mail is safe and reliable:

• Men (43%) were more likely to believe that voting by mail is safe and reliable than women were (29%).
• Respondents from British Columbia were more likely to think voting by mail is safe and reliable (48%), while respondents from Quebec were less likely (25%).
• Electors living in urban or suburban areas were more likely to think voting by mail is safe and reliable (38%), while those in rural or small-town areas were less likely (31%).
• Respondents with a university education (42%) were more likely to believe that voting by mail is safe and reliable, while respondents with a college or trade degree (30%) and high school or less education were less likely (25%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (42%) were more likely to believe that voting by mail is safe and reliable, while those who are not interested were less likely (23%).
• Electors who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (50%) were more likely to believe that voting by mail is safe and reliable, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs (30%) and those with strong conspiracy beliefs (22%) were less likely.
• Respondents who are generally trustful of people (51%) were more likely to believe that voting by mail is safe and reliable than those who are distrustful (27%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics are more likely to think voting by mail is safe and reliable (38%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin (24%) were less likely.
• Respondents who feel somewhat polarized politically (40%) were more likely to consider that voting by mail is safe and reliable, while those who do not feel polarized (30%) were less likely.

Types of voter fraud

Electors were asked how often they think different types of voter fraud happen in Canadian federal elections.

Similar to March 2023, two in five (42%) electors in March 2024 think that someone impersonating someone else is a type of voter fraud that happens in Canadian federal elections, with one in 10 (10%) thinking it happens often and one in three (31%) thinking it happens sometimes. .

Over a third (38%) think that someone voting who is not a Canadian citizen happens often (10%) or sometimes (28%), and a third (34%) also think that someone voting more than once happens often (8%) or sometimes (26%). The smallest proportion (29%) think someone stealing or tampering with ballots after they have been cast happens often (7%) or sometimes (21%).

All proportions remain stable since March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "someone impersonating someone else" is a kind of fraud that happens often or sometimes in Canadian federal elections:

• Women (44%) were more likely to think impersonation happens than men (39%).
• Electors living in Quebec (49%) were more likely to think impersonation happens, while electors living in British Columbia (36%) were less likely.
• Respondents living in rural areas or small towns (46%) were more likely to think impersonation happens than those who live in urban or suburban areas (40%).
• Respondents with some college or trade school education (47%) were more likely to think impersonation happens, while those with at least some university education (38%) were less likely to think so.
• Respondents without a disability were more likely (43%) to think impersonation happens, while those with one were less likely (35%).
• Infrequent voters (46%) were more likely, while habitual voters (40%) were less likely.
• Those who did not vote in the 2021 election (51%) were more likely than those who voted in 2021 (40%).
• Respondents who do not have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (46%) were more likely, while those who do (40%) were less likely.
• Electors with strong (66%) conspiracy beliefs were more likely to think impersonation happens, while those who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (28%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (47%) were more likely to think impersonation happens than those who tend to be trustful (36%).
• Respondents who feel strongly polarized politically (49%) were more likely to think impersonation happens, while those who do not feel polarized (38%) were less likely.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "someone voting who is not a Canadian citizen" is a kind of fraud that happens often or sometimes in Canadian federal elections:

• Electors from British Columbia (32%) were less likely to think it happens often or sometimes compared to electors in all other provinces.
• Respondents living in rural or small towns (43%) were more likely to think someone voting who is not a Canadian citizen is a kind of fraud that happens often or sometimes than those who live in urban or suburban areas (37%).
• Respondents with a high school or less education (45%) and those with a college-level education (43%) were more likely to think non-citizen voting happens, while those with some university education (33%) were less likely.
• Indigenous electors (55%) were more likely to think non-citizen voting happens than non-Indigenous electors (38%).
• Infrequent voters (42%) were more likely to think non-citizen voting happens than habitual voters (37%).
• Those who did not vote in the 2021 election (44%) were more likely.
• Respondents who have no knowledge of federal and provincial powers (42%) were more likely, while those who do (37%) were less likely.
• Electors with strong conspiracy beliefs (65%) and mixed conspiracy beliefs (41%) were more likely to think non-citizen voting happens, while those who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (22%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (44%) were more likely to think non-citizen voting happens than those who tend to be trustful (32%).
• Respondents who do not feel polarized (36%) were less likely.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "someone voting more than once" is a kind of fraud that happens often or sometimes in Canadian federal elections:

• Electors living in Quebec (38%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens.
• Respondents in rural or small towns (38%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens than those in urban or suburban areas (33%).
• Respondents with a high school degree or less (40%) and those with some college or trade education (38%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens, while those with at least some university education (29%) were less likely.
• Indigenous voters (48%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens than non-Indigenous voters (33%).
• Infrequent voters (41%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens than habitual voters (32%).
• 2021 non-voters (42%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens than 2021 voters (32%).
• Respondents who do not have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (41%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens than those who do (32%).
• Electors with strong conspiracy beliefs (61%) and mixed conspiracy beliefs (36%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens, while those who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (18%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (39%) were more likely to think multiple voting happens than those who tend to be trustful (28%).
• Respondents who do not feel polarized (31%) were less likely.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that "someone stealing or tampering with ballots after they have been cast" is a kind of fraud that happens often or sometimes in Canadian federal elections:

• Women (32%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens than men (26%).
• Electors aged 18 to 34 (37%) and between 35 and 54 (32%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens, while electors 55 and older were less likely (21%).
• Respondents from Ontario (31%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens, while those from Quebec (25%) were less likely.
• Respondents living in a rural or small-town area (35%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens than those living in urban or suburban areas (26%).
• Respondents with a high school degree or less education (35%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens, while those with some university education (25%) were less likely.
• Indigenous electors (41%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens.
• Respondents who are not interested in politics (33%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens, while those who are interested were less likely (27%).
• Infrequent voters (40%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens than habitual voters (25%).
• 2021 non-voters (44%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens than 2021 voters (25%).
• Respondents who do not have knowledge of provincial and federal powers (41%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens than those who do (25%).
• Electors with strong (65%) conspiracy beliefs were more likely to think ballot tampering happens, while those who do not hold conspiracy beliefs (12%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of other people (36%) were more likely to think ballot tampering happens than those who tend to be trustful (20%).
• Respondents who rarely see news about politics from any origin were more likely (36%), while respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were less likely (27%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat (32%) or strongly (35%) polarized politically were more likely to think ballot tampering happens, while those who do not feel polarized (25%) were less likely.

Political efficacy

In March 2024, two thirds of electors (67%) said they do not think the government cares much what people like them think: 28% strongly agreed and 40% somewhat agreed. Around half of Canadian electors (49%) agreed either strongly (12%) or somewhat (37%) that sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that someone like them can't understand it. Finally, four in 10 (41%) agreed that all federal political parties are basically the same and do not really offer a choice, including 11% who strongly agreed and 30% who somewhat agreed.

In March 2024, a significantly higher proportion of Canadian electors agreed with the statement "I do not think government cares much about what people like me think" (67% versus 65% in March 2023).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to agree with the statement "I do not think government cares much about what people like me think":

• Women (70%) were more likely to agree than men (65%).
• Respondents living in Alberta (73%) were more likely to agree, while those living in Quebec (64%) were less likely to agree.
• Respondents with some college or trade education (74%) and high school or less education (72%) were more likely to agree, while those with university education (62%) were less likely.
• Respondents who identified as having a disability were more likely to agree (74%) than those without one (67%).
• Respondents who hold strong (88%) conspiracy beliefs were more likely to agree, while those who hold no conspiracy beliefs (56%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (75%) were more likely to agree than those who tend to be trustful (60%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely (69%) to agree, while respondents who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely (60%).
• Respondents who feel strongly polarized politically (74%) were more likely to agree compared to those who do not feel polarized (64%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to agree with the statement "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that someone like me can't really understand what's going on":

• Women (55%) were more likely to agree than men (43%).
• 18- to 34-year-old respondents (56%) were more likely to agree, while respondents aged 55 and older (44%) were less likely.
• Respondents living in a rural or small town area were more likely to agree (54%) than those living in urban or suburban areas (47%).
• Respondents with a high school education or less (64%) were more likely to agree, while those with some university-level education (42%) were less likely.
• Indigenous respondents were more likely to agree (60%).
• Respondents with a disability were more likely to agree (54%).
• Respondents who are not interested in politics (62%) were more likely to agree than those who are interested (43%).
• Infrequent voters (60%) were more likely to agree than habitual voters (45%).
• 2021 non-voters (59%) were more likely to agree than 2021 voters (46%).
• Respondents with no knowledge of federal and provincial powers (61%) were more likely to agree than those who do have knowledge of them (45%).
• Respondents with strong (64%) or mixed (53%) conspiracy beliefs were more likely to agree, while those with no conspiracy beliefs (36%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (56%) were more likely to agree than those who tend to be trustful (42%).
• Respondents who often see news about US/world politics but rarely see news about Canadian politics (58%), as well as those who rarely see news about politics from any origin (54%), were more likely to agree, while those who often see news about Canadian politics (48%) were less likely.
• Respondents who feel strongly polarized politically (54%) were more likely to agree, while those who do not feel polarized are less likely (45%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to agree with the statement "All federal political parties are basically the same, there is not really a choice":

• Women (43%) were more likely to agree than men (38%).
• Respondents aged 35 to 54 (45%) were more likely to agree than others.
• Respondents living in rural or small-town areas (48%) were more likely to agree than those who live in urban or suburban areas (38%).
• Those with a high school or less education (47%) or some college or trade education (48%) were more likely to agree, while those with some university education (34%) were less likely.
• Respondents who are not interested in politics (49%) were more likely to agree than those who are interested (37%).
• Infrequent voters (52%) were more likely to agree than habitual voters (37%).
• 2021 non-voters (53%) were more likely to agree than 2021 voters (38%).
• Respondents who do not know provincial and federal powers (50%) were more likely to agree than those who do (38%).
• Respondents with strong (64%) conspiracy beliefs were more likely to agree, while those with no conspiracy beliefs (29%) were less likely.
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (48%) were more likely to agree than those who are trustful (33%).

Affective polarization

Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the following two statements:

• I find it easier to relate to people if I agree with them politically.
• I find it harder to relate to people if I disagree with them politically.

Respondents more often expressed feeling an affinity toward those they agreed with politically rather than an aversion to those with whom they disagreed: half (50%) of respondents agreed to a large or moderate extent that they find it easier to relate to people if they agree with them politically, including 13% who agreed to a large extent and 37% to a moderate extent; 39% agreed that they find it harder to relate to people if they disagree with them politically, including 8% who agreed to a large extent and 30% to a moderate extent.

The responses to both statements were added to develop a measure of affective political polarization, where a person is considered to feel more strongly polarized in how they relate to others politically the more they feel an affinity toward those they agree with politically while also feeling an aversion toward those with whom they disagree.⁴

Based on this definition, around half (47%) of Canadian electors did not feel polarized in how they relate to other Canadians, in that they did not find it easier to relate to those they agreed with politically, nor did they find it harder to relate to those with whom they disagreed. On the other hand, a minority of 14% felt strongly polarized, meaning they found it easier to relate to those they agreed with politically to a large or moderate extent while also agreeing to a similar extent that it was harder for them to relate to those with whom they disagreed. Over a third (39%) felt somewhat polarized, falling in the middle of the two groups. The results remain stable since March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to feel strongly polarized in how they related to others politically:

• 18- to 34-year-olds were more likely to feel strongly polarized (19%), while those 55 years and older were less likely (11%).
• Respondents living in British Columbia (18%) were more likely to feel polarized, while those living in Manitoba/Saskatchewan (7%) were less likely.
• Respondents living in an urban or suburban area (15%) were more likely to feel strongly polarized than those living in rural or small-town areas (11%).
• Respondents with a university degree were more likely to feel strongly polarized (15%).
• Indigenous respondents were more likely to feel strongly polarized (22%).
• Canadian-born respondents were more likely to feel strongly polarized (14%)
• Respondents with a disability (19%) were more likely to feel polarized, while those without one were less likely (13%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (16%) were more likely to feel strongly polarized than those who are not interested in politics (7%).
• Habitual voters were more likely to feel strongly polarized (15%), while infrequent voters were less likely (10%).
• Those with strong conspiracy beliefs (18%) were more likely to feel strongly polarized, while those with mixed conspiracy beliefs were less likely (11%).
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics were more likely to feel strongly polarized (15%), while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin were less likely to feel strongly polarized (6%).

Trust in people

A slight majority (57%) of Canadians said that, generally speaking, they need to be careful when dealing with people, while almost four in 10 (39%) said that most people can be trusted. Results remain stable since March 2023.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that most people can be trusted:

• Men (42%) were more likely to think that most people can be trusted than women were (36%).
• Respondents aged 55 and older (45%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted, while those aged 18 to 34 (32%) were less likely.
• Electors from British Columbia were more likely to say that most people can be trusted (45%), while those from Ontario were less likely (36%).
• Respondents with at least some university education (45%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted, while those with some college or trade education (36%) or high school or less (28%) were less likely.
• Non-Indigenous respondents were more likely to say that most people can be trusted (40%).
• Canadian-born respondents were more likely to say that most people can be trusted (40%).
• Respondents without a disability were more likely to say that most people can be trusted (41%), while those who have one are less likely (28%).
• Respondents who are interested in politics (43%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted than those who are not interested (29%).
• Habitual voters (44%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted than infrequent voters (24%).
• Respondents who voted in 2021 GE (43%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted than those who were eligible but did not vote (32%).
• Respondents with knowledge of provincial and federal powers (42%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted than those without this knowledge (29%).
• Respondents with no conspiracy beliefs (56%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted, while those with mixed (30%) or strong (28%) conspiracy beliefs were less likely to do so.
• Respondents who often see news about Canadian politics (42%) were more likely to say that most people can be trusted, while those who rarely see news about politics from any origin (26%) were less likely.

Belief in government conspiracy theories

Belief in broad conspiracy theories about government remained similar in March 2024 compared with March 2023, as less than half of respondents accepted each of the theories presented as being probably or definitely true. The most accepted theory (42%) was that certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events, with 10% thinking it was definitely true and 32% probably true. About one third (34%) thought that experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent (9% definitely true, 25% probably true). One in five (21%) Canadian electors thought that the government is trying to cover up the link between vaccines and autism (6% definitely true, 15% probably true).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that the statement "certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events" was definitely or probably true:

• Respondents aged between 18 and 34 years old were less likely than others to accept this as true (38%).
• Electors from Alberta were more likely to accept this as true (51%).
• Respondents with a high school education or less (46%) and those with some college or trade school (48%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those with some university (36%) were less likely to accept it.
• Indigenous respondents were more likely to accept this as true (52%).
• Immigrant electors (50%) were more likely to accept this as true than Canadian-born electors (40%).
• Infrequent voters (48%) were more likely to accept this as true, while habitual voters (39%) were less likely.
• Respondents who did not vote in the 2021 GE (54%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those who voted were less likely (39%).
• Respondents who do not have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (47%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who do have this knowledge (40%).
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (48%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who tend to be trustful (34%).
• Respondents who felt somewhat polarized politically (46%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those who do not feel polarized (37%) were less likely.

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that the statement "experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent" is definitely or probably true:

• Electors aged 35 to 54 (39%) were more likely to accept this as true, while electors aged 55 and older (28%) were less likely.
• Ontario respondents (37%) were more likely to accept this as true, while Quebec respondents (27%) were less likely.
• Respondents with a high school or less education (43%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those with a university education (29%) were less likely.
• Indigenous electors (46%) were more likely to accept this as true than non-Indigenous electors (33%).
• Immigrant electors (40%) were more likely to accept this as true than Canadian-born electors (32%).
• Respondents who are not interested in politics (38%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who are interested (32%).
• Infrequent voters (44%) were more likely to accept this as true than habitual voters (30%).
• Respondents who did not vote in the 2021 GE (49%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those who voted were less likely (30%).
• Respondents who do not have knowledge of federal and provincial powers (47%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who do have this knowledge (30%).
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (41%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who tend to be trustful (25%).
• People who often see news about Canadian politics were less likely (33%) to accept this as true.
• Respondents who feel somewhat polarized are more likely to accept this as true (37%), while those who do not feel polarized are less likely (30%).

The following subgroups were more or less likely to think that the statement "The government is trying to cover up the link between vaccines and autism" is definitely or probably true:

• Electors aged 35 to 54 (26%) were more likely to accept this as true, while electors 55 and older (17%) were less likely.
• Electors living in Ontario (23%) were more likely to accept this as true, while electors living in Quebec (16%) were less likely.
• Respondents living in rural or small-town areas (24%) were more likely to accept this as true than those living in urban or suburban areas (20%).
• Respondents with a high school or less education (28%) and some college or trade school degree (24%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those with at least some university education (17%) were less likely.
• Indigenous electors (32%) were more likely to accept this as true than non-Indigenous electors (20%).
• Immigrant electors (28%) were more likely to accept this as true than Canadian-born electors (19%).
• Infrequent voters (30%) were more likely to accept this as true than habitual voters (18%).
• Respondents who did not vote in the 2021 GE (36%) were more likely to accept this as true, while those who were eligible but did not vote were less likely (17%).
• Respondents who do not know provincial and federal powers (35%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who do (17%).
• Respondents who tend to be distrustful of people (25%) were more likely to accept this as true than those who tend to be trustful (16%).
• Respondents who feel somewhat (25%) polarized politically were more likely to accept this as true, while those who do not feel polarized (17%) were less likely.

Respondents were categorized as having strong, mixed or no conspiracy beliefs, where those who accepted all statements as at least probably true or any two statements as definitely true were considered to have strong conspiracy beliefs, while those who rejected all of the statements as probably or definitely false were considered to have no beliefs, and all others were considered to have mixed beliefs. Based on this definition, 15% of respondents in March 2024 were identified as having strong conspiracy beliefs, 51% had mixed beliefs, and 34% had no beliefs.

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