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An exploratory investigation into the erroneous cognitions of pathological and social fruit machine gamblersCrawford Moodie, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow,
Scotland. Abstract
Although
the literature concerning the association between irrational thinking and
gambling continues to grow, a number of methodological problems raise
questions about the validity of such findings. The present research examined
the cognitions and beliefs of a small convenience sample of pathological (n
= 5) and social (n = 5) fruit machine gamblers using a within- and
between-subjects design, employing the think-aloud method, the Gambling
Beliefs Questionnaire, and a semistructured interview. Pathological gamblers
were found to display greater levels of irrationality than social gamblers
on all three measures. However, by undertaking a methodology more rigorous
than that of previous research, this study found that irrational thinking
may not be as prominent a reason behind gambling as has been suggested. IntroductionErroneous cognitions related to gambling behaviour have been noted for some time, with Bolen & Boyd (1968) stating that the 'astonishing, illogical conviction that the gambler will eventually win frequently defies comprehension and certainly defies the laws of probability' (p. 622). Cognitive theories of gambling are evident within the gambling literature, with some researchers favouring a cognitive model of gambling in which winning money is the predominant factor underlying gambling behaviour (Walker, 1992b; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sylvain, Ladouceur, & Boisvert, 1997). Aside from the growing body of research providing support for the importance of cognitive factors in those with gambling problems, the effectiveness of treatment interventions aimed at cognitive correction of randomness and chance adds credence to the usefulness of a cognitive model of gambling for research and treatment purposes (Ladouceur, Sylvain, Letarte, Giroux, & Jacques, 1998; Ladouceur et al., 2001; Ladouceur et al., 2003). A number of methods can be used to assess cognitions and beliefs in gambling samples, with Joukhador, MacCallum, & Blaszczynski (2003) examining the cognitive distortions of 56 problem gamblers and 52 social gamblers using a new instrument they devised called the Gambling Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ). They found that on all measures (except denial) problem gamblers displayed significantly greater cognitive distortions than social gamblers, e.g., superstitious beliefs about gambling, the illusion of control, and the gambler's fallacy. Such results indicate that pathological gambling is related to a broad range of mistaken beliefs and distorted cognitions. Similar results are reported by studies using the 'think-aloud method' (TAM), which is a different method of investigating gambling thoughts whereby the individual has to speak aloud while gambling (Coulombe, Ladouceur, Desharnais, & Jobin, 1992; Griffiths, 1994; Coventry & Norman, 1998). These studies have found that regular or problem gamblers are significantly more likely to make erroneous verbalisations while gambling than nonregular or social gamblers. Erroneous verbalisations include statements such as ‘This machine is making me mad on purpose’ [personification] or ‘I haven’t won for a while, so I must be due a win’ [not understanding probability]. In terms of the strategic thinking of gamblers, i.e., thoughts related specifically to gambling, other studies using the TAM have found irrational thinking to be particularly high—ranging from 75% to 86% (Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Walker, 1992a; Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989). Other methods of assessing gambling thoughts such as observation and interviews with gamblers similarly reveal cognitive distortions to be present (King, 1990; Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997). From the above research it could be argued that erroneous cognitions are integral to problematic gambling behaviour. However, it has to be noted that there are several methodological problems inherent in the techniques used by these earlier studies which have to be addressed before any conclusive argument can be made for the role of distorted cognitions in the development and maintenance of gambling behaviour. Problems with gambling instruments measuring cognitions and beliefsOnly a handful of instruments assessing gambling-related thoughts exist and most remain untested, such as the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & Oei, 2004). The Gambling Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (GABS; Breen & Zuckerman, 1999) measures gambling attitudes as well as erroneous cognitions and beliefs, although Strong, Breen, & Lejuez (2004) found that only 15 (of the original 35) items effectively discriminated between students and clinical gambling samples. Of these 15 items only a limited number of questions relating to erroneous beliefs or cognitions remain, many addressing similar cognitions or beliefs. The Gamblers' Beliefs Questionnaire (Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Whelan, 2002) is a 21-item scale measuring gambling-related thoughts, with all items loading upon two factors: Illusion of Control and Luck/Perseverance. Similarly, the 22-item Drake Beliefs about Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham, 2005) loads upon only two factors—Illusion of Control and Superstition—and collectively the GABS, Gamblers' Beliefs Questionnaire, and DBC are limited in that they only measure certain gambling-related cognitions. Finally, the GBQ appears a promising instrument as it has questions relating to a wider variety of cognitive distortions than these previous instruments. Of course, it may be that the quantity of irrational beliefs assessed by any of these instruments is not informative of the strength of these beliefs (Delfabbro, 2004), and there is an a priori assumption that the items on these screens are correctly understood. Problems with sample
A second methodological issue which has to be addressed in the area of
erroneous beliefs and gambling is the type of gamblers researched. For
example, all the problem gamblers in Joukhador et al.'s (2003) study were
seeking treatment at the time of the study, which may have had an impact on
the study's findings. Assessing gamblers at an advanced stage of their
gambling careers, where treatment is necessitated, may not be representative
of the wider population
of
active gamblers and therefore such findings should be treated cautiously.
The reliability of studies examining cognitive processes associated with
gambling can also be questioned where there is a reliance on students
(Walker, 1992a; Kweitel & Allen, 1998; Côté, Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, &
Ladouceur, 2003) or use of retrospective data (Toneatto et al., 1997).
Furthermore, Problems with TAM
In
earlier studies, Griffiths (1994) and Coulombe et al. (1992) used the TAM to
examine gambling beliefs over a short time, less than 10 min per participant
on average. The regular gamblers in
Apart
from the methodological issues surrounding the TAM, there is a serious
problem with the TAM technique itself. Researchers employing this technique
develop coding schemes in order to make sense of the thoughts elicited
during the course of the study, which in itself could be construed as
problematic given the inherent complexities in attempting to translate these
utterances into meaningful psychological constructs (Dickerson & Baron,
2000). This has led researchers to develop often very different coding
schemes (e.g., Ecological validity
The
importance of ecological validity in such studies cannot be overemphasised
as attempting to unravel the true extent to which erroneous cognitions
maintain gambling involvement can never be realised in laboratory settings.
The use of laboratory settings to assess erroneous cognitions (e.g.,
Kassinove & Schare, 2001; Ladouceur & Sévigny, 2005; McGrath, Finlay,
Kanetkar, Londerville, & Marmurek, 2006) is a further methodological issue
which has to be addressed. Apart from the problem of reduced participant
motivation ( A methodology, which may address the above-mentioned research issues in the area of gambling and erroneous beliefs, is to adopt a multifaceted approach, employing the TAM (in an ecologically valid setting), a relevant gambling questionnaire, and a semistructured interview. This would enable a more accurate assessment of gamblers' thoughts while gambling and while not gambling and the identification of the most prominent features of their thinking in relation to their gambling. The major aim of this exploratory study was to advance the knowledge of the association between gambling behaviour (specifically fruit machine gambling) and gamblers' mistaken beliefs by undertaking a methodology more rigorous than that of previous research. The study involved an intensive examination of gamblers' beliefs both within and outside a gambling environment using the TAM, the GBQ, and a postexperimental semistructured interview. It was hypothesised that pathological gamblers would display a greater number of mistaken beliefs than social gamblers during the TAM, and also in the GBQ and interview. It was also hypothesised that a number of the so-called erroneous cognitions identified by the TAM and the GBQ would be adequately explained in the interview. MethodDesign and participants
The
experiment employed a three-phase within- and between-subjects design, in
which participants engaged in the TAM while gambling, completed the GBQ
several days later, and finally participated in a semistructured interview 4
weeks later. A total of ten fruit machine gamblers (five pathological and
five social gamblers) were recruited, predominantly from the arcade, with
there being no refusals. Most fruit machine gamblers were male (n =
7), although this is not uncommon in this form of gambling ( MaterialsThe revised edition (48 items) of the GBQ (Joukhador et al., 2003) was employed along with the SOGS (Lesieur & Blume, 1987), which is a reliable and valid instrument that has been widely used. A Sony minidisc recorder (MZ-NH900) attached to a small unobtrusive microphone was used to record the participants' verbalisations while gambling. A similar apparatus was used during the semistructured interview. Procedure
Ethical
approval was obtained from the Psychology Department in Phase 1 (TAM)In the first phase of the study the experimenter arranged to meet participants before a gambling session. The verbal instructions the participants received were similar to those used in past research (Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Walker, 1992a), but with subtle differences: State everything that comes to mind during the gambling session, no matter how unimportant you consider it to be. Do not censor your thoughts and do not attempt to justify statements. You do not have to speak in complete sentences, and don't worry if you feel that what you're saying does not make sense. Just act as you normally would when gambling and try to speak in a clear voice. For the task you should try to speak as often as possible, although you do not have to speak continuously. In order to enhance ecological validity it was beneficial to remain with the gamblers for a longer period of time than previous research in this area has managed. This was advantageous as it allowed the cognitions displayed throughout the entire session or a significant part of it to be monitored, rather than simply trying to gain an insight into the thinking of gamblers during a brief period of a gambling session. The recording was made via a small microphone attached to a light, small minidisc recorder. Although previous studies (Griffiths, 1994; Coventry & Norman, 1998) have requested participants to speak continuously during the task, this was not considered appropriate on the grounds that it may actually induce irrational statements and therefore inadvertently affect the results. Furthermore, as the intention was to have the participants perform the task for approximately 90 min, this would have been an arduous task. Instead, participants were asked to speak as frequently as possible and were prompted to do so if silent for a minute or so during the task. If the recording was not of a sufficient time, participants were asked if they would consent to being recorded in a subsequent gambling session. This only applied to three pathological gamblers who had lost their money quickly on the first occasion, but who willingly agreed to do the TAM again. Coding scheme
A coding
scheme similar to that of Inadequate verbalisations included predictions or confirmation of predictions or systems employed; references related to personal control or skill, mentioning cause and effect; references relating to a lack of understanding of probability; and statements regarding personification. Adequate verbalisations included statements relating to lack of personal control, knowledge of probability, and stating that although their luck should change it does not necessarily mean they are going to win anything. Descriptive verbalisations included statements describing some aspect of the game. This category seems appropriate where fruit machines are involved, given the high degree of player involvement that exists in modern fruit machines. Other verbalisations included all remaining verbalisations not classified as adequate, inadequate, or descriptive.
The
verbalisations were transcribed within 12 hours of the completion of the TAM
and coded according to the previous coding scheme. Ten percent of
verbalisations were subsequently independently rated, with 45% being rated
identically, indicating a low degree of interrater reliability. As with Phase 2 (GBQ)Each participant was given the GBQ several days after completing the first phase (the TAM) and asked to carefully complete it and return it at a mutually convenient time. The GBQ was not given directly after the first phase of the study because questionnaires given directly before or after a gambling occasion may not be the most accurate way of studying cognitive activity (Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989). Phase 3 (Semistructured interview)After the participant returned the completed GBQ, a semistructured interview was arranged for a later date, at least 4 weeks after the return of the GBQ. The reasoning behind this delay was to ascertain a temporal view of cognitions, assessed in different ways over a period of time. For this final phase of the study, all participants were given the same questions related to early experiences of gambling and fruit machine gambling, winning, skill, strategies, near misses, probability, reasons behind gambling, etc. All questions were related to experiences of gambling and as they required some thought they were provided a week in advance of the interview. The semistructured interview consisted of these questions and at least 25 additional questions that the participants were unaware of. These additional questions were related to the items initially asked, but tailored specifically for each participant's responses on the GBQ and recorded verbalisations during the TAM. In this way, the interview allowed a degree of internal triangulation, where consistencies or inconsistencies across assessments could be established or addressed. The main reason behind the interview was to establish the degree to which erroneous cognitions actually exist in fruit machine gamblers. The participants were given the opportunity to provide explanations for statements in the TAM that past studies have deemed irrational. Joukhador et al. (2003) highlight a justifiable criticism that could be directed at this approach, which is that subjective interpretation is required in order to analyse the findings. Without allowing the participant to explain such statements, and no matter what criteria are used to categorise verbalisations, the participant is not given the chance to adequately explain statements made. This is equally true for the GBQ, or any similar questionnaire, where the participant is not given the chance to adequately explain why they endorsed particular items, or if they understood all of the items. The effectiveness of each of the three methods (TAM, GBQ, interview) used to capture gambling-related thoughts is an important issue where past and future research is concerned and was also discussed in the interview. This allowed participants the opportunity to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each of these methods, which may be more informative than having researchers retrospectively describe the problems they considered particular methods to have. ResultsPhase 1 (TAM)The 10 participants gambled for a total of 1017 min (mean = 101.7; range 67–147) and produced a total of 2814 verbalisations (mean = 281.4; range 149–377); see Table 1. The five pathological gamblers produced an average of 322.8 statements, which was significantly more than that of the five social gamblers, who produced 240.0 statements (t = 2.4, df = 8, p < .05). The types of verbalisations made were predominantly in the descriptive category. The sample averaged 13.5 adequate and 22.2 inadequate verbalisations, with social gamblers more likely to make adequate verbalisations and pathological gamblers inadequate verbalisations (Table 1).
Table 1.
*Statistically significant as tested by t-tests (p < 0.05).
Percentage of inadequate verbalisations: Using the
same method employed by For example, the following expression was used to calculate the percentage of inadequate verbalisations produced:
where I = inadequate verbalisations, A = adequate verbalisations, D = descriptive verbalisations, and O = other verbalisations.
Table 2.
Types of inadequate statements made: Among the sample, predictions or confirmation of predictions were the most common form of inadequate statement made (34.5%), followed by not understanding probability (24.5%), personification (21.4%), cause and effect (13.6%), and finally references to skill or personal control (6.0%). Table 3 provides examples of each type of inadequate verbalisation.
Table 3.
Phase 2 (GBQ)The average GBQ score, which can range from 0 to 192, was 61.2 (SD = 28.3, range 23-117); pathological gamblers 76.2 (SD = 28.4; range 50–117); social gamblers 46.2 (SD = 21; range 23–78). Although the mean GBQ scores were higher for pathological gamblers, t-tests revealed no significant differences between the social and pathological gamblers on the GBQ. Phase 3 (semistructured interview)The sample was asked which of the three methods used in the study was most effective in terms of capturing gambling-related thoughts (Table 4). The TAM, GBQ, and interview were difficult to separate, although all participants rated the GBQ as the best or second-best way of capturing their gambling-related thoughts.
Table 4.
*The interview and GBQ were considered joint second-best methods for participant 6. Predictions: Statements in the TAM regarding predictions, personification, and skill made up more than 60% of all the statements categorised as inadequate, and participants were asked in the interview to explain such statements. Predicting what will happen or confirming predictions in a chance situation would logically be considered irrational, although most of the sample (n = 8) did exactly this. However, regardless of gambling group, participants indicated that it was 'just down to experience' (participant 8), with fruit machines being no more than computerised programmes—'it's a programme at the end of the day; it does the same things' (participant 6). Participants did not indicate that they could 'predict 100%' (participant 1) exactly what is going to happen while playing fruit machines, but most believed that after 'you play the machines for so many years' (participant 3) and 'so many times' (participant 6), they have come to know what to expect. As it happened, many of the predictions made by the participants in the TAM were accurate. Personification: Statements regarding personification were made by all but one of the sample. Only one social gambler failed to satisfactorily explain a statement involving personification, perhaps due to the fact that she had only recently started playing fruit machines and had appeared on many occasions to be uncertain about what to do during the TAM. Perhaps the confusion shown while playing fruit machines was also evident in the interview. The participants were asked in the interview to explain statements they had made during the TAM, such as 'Something about this machine doesn't like me' (participant 2) or 'The machine makes you put another pound in' (participant 4). The participants responded 'I'm not saying the machine has emotional feelings towards me [laughing]' and 'I'm not saying the machine is forcing me to do it, it's just a machine', with both stating that it is just phraseology used within a gambling context. Other common examples of personification were statements such as 'Stupid thing' (participant 1), 'What are you all about machine' (participant 6) or 'It [the machine] must have heard me' (participant 8). Participant 9 actually had 23 statements categorised as inadequate due to personification, although 22 of these statements were 'Come on machine'. Participants were alike in their responses, explaining personification as nothing more than statements made within a gambling establishment, which 'do not mean anything' (participants 1, 6, 8, and 9). Skill and strategies: Skill and strategies contribute to the illusion of control and therefore erroneous beliefs. The six participants who considered themselves to be more skilful than others elaborated by saying that this was due to 'experience' (participants 5 and 6), or was 'mostly knowledge and understanding' (participants 1, 2, 3, and 4). For the few participants that stated they had strategies in the interview, such strategies were not actually specific strategies at all, with descriptions of strategies being 'I just stick to what I know' (participant 6), or 'I just make sure I play the ones I know' (participant 7). The last participant claiming to have strategies failed to elaborate on what these strategies actually were and rationally stated, 'bear in mind it's a machine at the end of the day; you're still going to either lose to it or come out winning' (participant 2). Other inadequate responses addressed in interview: The sample were asked to explain other statements on the TAM or responses on the GBQ that were deemed inadequate, such as those relating to superstition (hunches, lucky signs, rituals), the gambler's fallacy, near wins, cause and effect, and flexible attribution. For example, participant 7, who said 'I shouldn't have jinxed myself and said that' during the TAM, and participant 3, who indicated on the GBQ that 'I believe rituals can help me win', were asked to explain their comments regarding superstition in the interview; see Figure 1. Figure 1 displays brief examples from the semistructured interview, and the response from participant 7 does not suggest that the participant held any superstitious beliefs, and participant 3 was clearly talking about rituals in relation to his Chinese cultural heritage, as opposed to do with gambling. These brief examples reflect many of the responses given by the sample when asked about possible erroneous cognitions that had been identified in the study.
Figure 1. Participant 7 R: At one point during the gambling phase you said 'so far so good' and then when you landed on a question mark you then said 'I shouldn't have jinxed myself and said that'. Do you have any superstitious beliefs about gambling? S: Em, not really, no. R: Anything you can think of?S: Just don't think you're, as they say don't think you've won until you've actually won, although I suppose that's not really superstitious.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Participant 3 R: You circled 2 for the item on the questionnaire 'I believe rituals can help me win', suggesting that this means something. So what are these rituals you're referring to? S: Well, you see Chinese have, Chinese people have a saying of rituals right, as in like if you pray to this kind of, eh, Buddha statue, it brings you good luck, where if you do this by the New Year, the day before New Year, all the luck brings, it brings you all the good luck to you, that's what I meant by that. R: Are you saying that's more a religious thing, rather than to do with gambling? S: It is, it's more a, how would you say, it's like more of a, eh, tradition, you know, to other cultures, not really gambling.
Comparisons between pathological and social gamblers in terms of explaining inadequate statements: It was hypothesised that pathological gamblers would make more inadequate statements than social gamblers during the TAM and have higher scores on the GBQ, which they did. As a result they were asked more questions in the interview relating to these inadequate responses than were social gamblers. Comparisons, however, can be made between the two groups, with the pathological gambling group adequately explaining 61.0% (36 of 59) of responses categorised as inadequate, compared to the social gambling group who adequately explained 68.1% (32 of 47) of responses categorised as inadequate. Reasons behind gambling: All five social gamblers indicated that they gambled mainly because of boredom, with two mentioning that they also gambled for excitement (participants 5 and 10). For the five pathological gamblers, three mentioned that they felt they were ‘addicted’ to gambling (participants 2, 3 and 9), one stated that he gambled because of the urge, i.e. impulsivity (participant 6) and the final gambler claimed to gamble for social reasons (participant 7). Mentions of escape, from boredom, problems in life and also from depression, were also made by four of the pathological gamblers (participant 3, 6, 7 and 9). Discussion
In
keeping with previous findings, pathological gamblers displayed a greater
number of erroneous cognitions than did social gamblers in the TAM, GBQ, and
interview, although in no case reaching significance. The interview allowed participants the opportunity to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of assessing erroneous cognitions, which may be beneficial for future research in this area. The TAM was considered a natural method for capturing exact thoughts instantaneously, which incontrovertibly is the main strength of this method. However, more than half the sample (n = 7) raised concerns about its usefulness, considering it to be an 'anxiety-provoking', 'unfamiliar experience' requiring time to become accustomed to. Given that many studies are completed within about 15 minutes or less, with limited or no preparation time (Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000; Griffiths, 1994; Coulombe et al., 1992), it is questionable as to whether the participants had a suitable period of time to get adjusted to speaking aloud. To highlight this point, two of the participants made significantly more statements after the first 20 minutes of the study, explaining that only after this period of time had elapsed did they feel at ease with the TAM.
Other
comments about the TAM included the difficulty associated with the knowledge
of being recorded, and the fact that things may be said simply to fill in
time. If participants in such experiments are simply saying anything to
satisfy demand characteristics then irrationality may well be artifactual ( The general consensus of the sample for the GBQ was that it was a useful instrument, being considered accurate and relevant to participants' gambling. It was viewed favourably as it allows the participants time to think about their responses (unlike the TAM) and it has a wide variety of choice. Therefore the GBQ was viewed by some as exploring a range of gambling beliefs including those which may not arise during a single gambling session and would not be captured by the TAM. However, a number of participants (n = 3) did indicate problems. One social gambler believed that some questions could be misinterpreted, and this point is supported by two pathological gamblers who thought that the questionnaire was alluding to a single gambling session. When asked in the interview why the two participants highly endorsed the items 'Eventually I can come out ahead from gambling' (item 3), ‘I’ve lost so much money I might as well keep going’ (item 36) and 'I can get my losses back' (item 41), both explained that a lot can happen in a single gambling session and they may be able to get their initial stake back, and possibly even more. Although it has been previously mentioned that timing may be an important factor in relation to responses on the GBQ, it may be that certain questions have to be phrased differently to ensure accurate responses. When subsequently informed that the questionnaire was referring to recouping the gambling losses they had accrued through their lives, both pathological gamblers responded that this would never happen. An important point to note is that although the items were clearly and rationally explained in the interview, they would have been deemed irrational in its absence. This echoes many of the statements made during the TAM and suggests that the high levels of so-called irrationality found in many studies may not be entirely accurate. Although there is no currently accepted instrument for measuring cognitive gambling beliefs (Joukhador, Blaszczynski, & MacCallum, 2004), the GBQ appears to be useful with it being considered either the best or second-best way to assess thoughts by all participants. Regular gamblers have been found to make more references to skill or are more likely to consider themselves more skilful than nonregular gamblers (Coulombe et al., 1992; Griffiths, 1994). The same number of pathological and social gamblers (n = 3) in the study considered themselves to have greater skills than others, although two of the social gamblers also admitted having fewer skills than those with more experience of fruit machines. This was a common theme where skill was concerned, with participants often saying that skill was to a large extent the equivalent of experience or knowledge of machines, with one participant saying 'knowledge of the machine is a skill in itself'. Langer (1975) noted that success in skill tasks is controllable whereas success in luck or chance situations (such as gambling) is uncontrollable. The belief that the opportunity to utilise greater skill or knowledge will allow frequent fruit machine gamblers to win more money than less knowledgeable fruit machine gamblers could be construed as a prime example of the illusion of control. However it is accurate to an extent, with Moodie & Finnigan (2005) finding that in a sample with an equal amount of money provided to each participant, that frequent fruit machine gamblers (n=21) won more money than infrequent fruit machine gamblers (n=21) who in turn won more than non-gamblers (n=21). This would not be expected in a totally random situation.
It has to be stressed that fruit machines are not the
equivalent of the video lottery terminals, slot machines, and poker machines
found in
Parke &
Griffiths (2004) describe a derivation of the near miss called 'credit
teasing', where a fruit machine player is confronted with an inviting
situation on the last credit and is therefore encouraged to insert more
money. Such inviting situations are numerous, including any repeat chances
on cash awards or feature awards, and also trail holds and third holds
(Parke & Griffiths, 2006). This idea of credit teasing appears to be a
common feature of modern fruit machines, being mentioned by a social gambler
and a pathological gambler. The pathological gambler made reference several
times to the fact that he thought the machine was deliberately inducing him
to put more money in to get a repeat or a third hold. Verbalisations such as
'it gees [gives] you a hold when you're down to your last 10 pence just so
you keep playing it' were further investigated in the interview when once
again the participant stated about the machine, 'I think it does that on
purpose'. Similarly, a social gambler often personified, or attributed human qualities to, a machine by suggesting it's 'having a laugh' or is 'at it' when in a losing situation. However, when given the opportunity in the interview to explain why he considered machines to have human-like qualities, the participant replied that 'the machine is programmed by a human, therefore it must have human qualities to draw and attract humans'. These statements concerning personification were not deemed irrational as fruit machines are obviously cleverly designed, utilising psychological knowledge concerning the near miss, etc., to attract and be as engaging as possible for gamblers. In fact, most statements regarding personification were more straightforward than the examples previously mentioned, such as 'stupid thing', 'come on machine', and 'what are you all about machine'. These statements were adequately explained in the interview, and it is difficult to justify why they would be construed as irrational in the first place. This, however, is exactly what has been done in previous research.
Cognitive
explanations of gambling suggesting that it is sustained by either the
belief in winning ( Limitations
The study
has a number of limitations that may have affected the findings, such as the
very small sample size employed, the uneven gender distribution, and the
limited age range of the sample. The sample was also restricted to fruit
machine gamblers, obtained from a single arcade in ConclusionsThe study found that although distorted cognitions or erroneous beliefs are evident within fruit machine gamblers, they are not as prominent as researchers favouring a cognitive model would suggest. Most studies assessing gambling-related thoughts falter through a number of methodological weaknesses (single forms of assessment, lab settings, use of only students or occasional gamblers, etc.), which limits the generalisability of their findings. Many studies only use the TAM, and problems with this method have been found with students (Walker, 1992a), nonstudents (Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000), and now active social and pathological gamblers. Little support was found for the notion that gamblers are predominantly concerned with winning, and for pathological gamblers escapist reasons appeared to have a greater influence on gambling maintenance. Cognitive biases and erroneous beliefs do indisputably have a role in gambling, and any theoretical model of gambling (Sharpe, 2002; Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Griffiths & Delfabbro, 2001) not incorporating distorted cognitive biases would have limited explanatory power and as such could be considered untenable. It could be argued, however, that the reliance on a unitary cognitive model is equally untenable. Perhaps cognitive explanations of gambling should supplement alternative gambling theoretical models (Frank & Smith, 1989). Similar larger-scale future research thoroughly investigating erroneous cognitions and beliefs in different forms of gambling, using multiple assessments, could provide an insight into the true role they have in the development and maintenance of gambling behaviour. ReferencesAnholt, G. E., Emmelkamp, P. M. G., Cath, D. C., van Oppen, P., Nelissen, H., & Smit, J. H. (2004). Do patients with OCD and pathological gambling have similar dysfunctional cognitions? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 529–537. Benhsain, K., Taillefer, A., & Ladouceur, R. (2004). Awareness of independence of events and erroneous perceptions while gambling. Addictive Behaviors, 29, 399–404. Blaszczynski, A., & Nower, L. (2002). A pathways model of problem and pathological gambling. Addiction, 97, 487–499. Blaszczynski, A. P., Wilson, A, C., & McConaghy, N. (1986). Sensation seeking and pathological gambling. British Journal of Addiction, 81, 113–117. Bolen, D. W., & Boyd, W. H. (1968). Gambling and the gambler. A review and preliminary findings. Archives of General Psychiatry, 18, 617–630. Breen, R. B., & Zuckerman, M. (1999). 'Chasing' in gambling behavior: Personality and cognitive determinants. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 1097–1111. Côté, D., Caron, A., Aubert, J., Desrochers, V., & Ladouceur, R. (2003). Near wins prolong gambling on a video lottery terminal. Journal of Gambling Studies, 19, 433–438. Coulombe, A., Ladouceur, R., Desharnais, R., & Jobin, J. (1992). Erroneous perceptions and arousal among regular and occasional video poker players. Journal of Gambling Studies, 8, 235–244. Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Michaud, V. (2004). Comparisons between the South Oaks Gambling Screen and a DSM-IV-based interview in a community survey of problem gambling. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 258–263. Delfabbro, P. (2004). The stubborn logic of regular gamblers: Obstacles and dilemmas in cognitive gambling research. Journal of Gambling Studies, 20, 1–21. Delfabbro, P., & Thrupp, L. (2003). The social determinants of youth gambling in South Australian adolescents. Journal of Adolescence, 26, 313–330. Delfabbro, P. H., & Winefield, A. H. (2000). Predictors of irrational thinking in slot-machine gambling. Journal of Psychology, 134, 17–28. Dickerson, M., & Baron, E. (2000). Contemporary issues and future directions for research into pathological gambling. Addiction, 95, 1145–1149.
Fisher,
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Wood, W. S., & Clapham, M. M. (2005). Development of the Drake Beliefs about Chance Inventory. Journal of Gambling Studies, 21, 411–430. Manuscript history: submitted: October 5, 2006; accepted: September 23, 2006. All URLs were active at the time of submission. This article was peer-reviewed.
For
correspondence: Crawford Moodie, Competing interests: The present research has no competing interests. Ethics approval: The Glasgow Caledonian University Ethics Committee approved on November 1, 2004, this research project entitled, 'An investigation into the erroneous cognitions of social and pathological fruit machine gamblers'.
Funding:
This research was funded by
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